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Abstract:  The EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) is a major but 
largely unstudied environmental regulation. Most of the 1585 large 
combustion plants in this analysis are electricity supply plants or combined 
heat and power plants. We find that, controlling for country characteristics 
and plant size, plants in the electricity supply, combined heat and power, 
district heating, and paper industries have a higher probability of being opted-
out of the emission limit values (ELVs), which necessitates eventual plant 
closure. Controlling for plant size and industry, increasing the amount of solid 
fuel or natural gas utilized at a plant is associated with a decreased likelihood 
of being opted-out of the ELVs. 
Keywords:  Large combustion plant directive, Utilities, Industrial emissions 
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In January 2008, the European Union (EU) implemented the 
Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) regulation, which requires 
large plants to limit emissions in all member countries in order to 
protect the environment and improve the economic welfare of EU 
citizens. Starting January 1, 2008, the LCPD mandates that large 
combustion plants, with rated thermal inputs of 50 MWth or higher, 
limit emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter 
(dust). The benefits of reducing these emissions include lower human 
exposure to pollutants that cause adverse health effects and less 
damage to ecosystems. However, there are compliance costs to this 
environmental policy, which can vary significantly by plant. Moreover, 
not every plant is required to respond to the LCPD in the same way. 
Specifically, the “limited life derogation clause” allows a plant to be 
“opted-out” of the LCPD emission limit values (ELVs) prescribed by the 
legislation provided that it will shut down after 20,000 h of operation. 
In this paper we take the first step toward quantifying the costs of the 
LCPD by identifying plant characteristics that associate positively with 
an increased probability of being opted-out of the ELVs. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms are choosing to shut 
down plants because of the LCPD. For example, E.ON UK stated that 
its power plants without flue gas desulphurization (FGD) would be 
opted-out of the directive and shut down by 2015.1 This includes the 
company's Ironbridge, Kingsnorth, and Grain power stations. It is 
unclear whether there might be an asymmetric response to the LCPD 
based upon the fuel mix or the size of the plant since the emission 
limits vary based upon these characteristics. It may be that plants of a 
certain type are impacted more than others. Furthermore, differences 
in industry structure can affect the likelihood of plants being opted-out 
of the LCPD. 
The primary goal of this research is to examine how different 
industries and fuel mixes are associated with the election of the limited 
life derogation clause of the LCPD. The majority of plants subject to 
the LCPD are electricity supply plants and combined heat and power 
plants; it is important for policy-makers to understand whether plants 
in these two industries are more likely to be opted-out of the 
ELVs.Solid fuels such as coal have earned a reputation for causing 
more adverse health effects than natural gas. Yet some EU countries, 
such as Poland, have a robust coal mining industry that employs many 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
[Utilities Policy, Vol 45, (April 2017): pg. 61-68. DOI. This article is © [Elsevier] and permission has been granted for this 
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. [Elsevier] does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from [Elsevier].] 
3 
 
people and generates much income (Suwala, 2010; Uliasz-Bochenczyk 
and Mokrzycki, 2007). Hence, although it may be economically 
efficient to avoid health-care costs by reducing emissions from burning 
coal, there may also be political costs from adversely affecting the coal 
industry.2 
We construct a dataset spanning 17 EU countries with a total of 
1585 large combustion plants including all plants that were or were 
not opted-out of the LCPD.3 Starting in 2004, each member country 
was required by the LCPD to report information on their large 
combustion plants. Using probit regression, we find that plants in the 
paper, energy supply, combined heat and power, and district heating 
industries have a higher probability of being opted-out of the LCPD 
limits. Plant characteristics are also important; larger plants have a 
higher probability of being opted-out while plants that use more solid 
fuel (such coal and lignite) and more natural gas have a lower 
probability of being opted-out. We also find that plants operating in 
less competitive markets have a lower probability of being opted-out. 
Command-and-control regulations are generally considered less 
efficient than incentive based policies, such as a tax or tradable 
permits.4 An interesting aspect of the LCPD is that countries can either 
choose to entirely follow the command-and-control ELVs or design 
their own national plan that would achieve the same overall level of 
emission reductions. A country that designs its own incentive based 
policy plan should be able to achieve the emission reductions at a 
lower overall cost. Also, a country that incorporates an emissions tax 
or a tradable emissions permit system into its plan would give 
individual plants more flexibility to comply with regulations. Therefore, 
we investigate whether or not plants in countries with national 
emission reduction plans have lower opt-out probabilities. Six (6) of 
the 17 EU countries we examine (Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, 
Portugal, and UK) designed their own national emission plans to 
reduce emissions as set by the LCPD. Confirming our theoretical 
expectations, we find that plants in these countries are opted out at 
lower probabilities. 
2. Previous literature 
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Policymakers regularly debate the economic effects of 
environmental regulation. The LCPD is an example of command-and-
control (direct) regulation. Theoretically, command-and-control 
regulation has limitations, particularly in terms of potential loss of 
economic efficiency when marginal abatement costs differ across 
firms. That is, command-and-control regulation may not minimize the 
cost of achieving a given pollution reduction goal. Yet, “there remains 
a need for more empirical evidence on the economic efficiency of direct 
regulation” (Iraldo et al., 2011). The relationships among 
environmental regulation, firm performance, and economic 
competitiveness are complex and may vary by context (Haq et al., 
2001; Iraldo et al., 2011). 
The LCPD is a major step towards reducing pollution in the 
European Union but the policy has received little academic analysis. 
Papers providing descriptive historical background on the LCPD include 
Ramus (1991) and Markusson (2012). Eames (2001) finds that 
countries comply with the regulation but costs associated with 
compliance vary at the national level. The paper was written before 
countries started reporting data required by European Environmental 
Agency (EEA) on plant emissions. Therefore, there is no analysis 
conducted on the effects of the directive on plants and industries. 
Although we are not directly examining a causal relationship 
between regulation and plant exit, the limited literature on the survival 
or exit of polluting plants is informative. Jiang (2012) examines the US 
refining industry, Chen (2002) studies the decline of industry due to 
deregulation of crude oil markets, and Becker and Henderson (2000) 
show that in response to emissions regulations, plants in industries 
that pollute tend to close and relocate to areas with less strict 
regulations. 
More generally, a literature review by Jeppesen and Folmer 
(2001) finds that stricter environmental policy is more likely to result 
in closure as compared to relocation of plants or reduced location of 
new plants. A recent survey by Millimet et al. (2009) concludes that 
the theoretical literature shows that increasing absolute environmental 
standards induces exit. Empirical evidence appears to support this. 
Henderson (1996) analyzes ground-level ozone regulation and finds 
that plants exit or relocate from areas that are more heavily regulated. 
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Snyder et al. (2003) find a similar result for chlorine-manufacturing 
plants. Deily and Gray (1991) and Helland (1998) find that plants that 
are less profitable or in declining industries are less likely to be 
inspected and therefore have lower probability of exiting. Kassinis and 
Vafeas (2009) compare the environmental performance of plants prior 
to their closure against plants that do not close and find that plants 
that close are subject to more regulatory pressure and reduce their 
emissions more compared to plants that do not close. Yin et al. (2007) 
find that environmental regulation can induce small firms to exit due to 
economies of scale and liquidity constraints. In a comparative study of 
power plants in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Višković et al. 
(2014) find that differential exposure to the EU ETS negatively impacts 
the more heavily regulated country, Croatia, in terms of economic 
competitiveness. Thus, most empirical evidence suggests that 
increased regulation can lead to decreased firm competitiveness. 
Nonetheless, theories and findings are not uniform concerning the 
effects of environmental regulation; utilizing a Delphi method survey, 
Korhonen et al. (2015) find that experts view tightening of 
environmental regulations in the pulp and paper industry as both a 
threat and an opportunity to businesses. Environmental regulation as 
an opportunity is consistent with the “Porter induced innovation 
hypothesis,” which states that environmental regulations spur firm 
innovation and hence increase firm competitiveness (Porter and van 
der Linde, 1995). 
3. Description of the LCPD 
The EU adopted the LCPD in October 2001, with the regulations 
taking effect January 2008.5 An EU directive, the LCPD requires 
Member States to reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides, and particulate matter from combustion plants with a rated 
thermal input of 50 MWth or more (Ritchie et al., 2005). Plants with 
thermal input of this scale include electricity plants, combined heat 
and power plants (CHP), district heating plants, oil refineries, sugar 
refineries, chemical manufacturers, and large industrial manufacturers 
(such as steelworks plants). The regulations are different for existing 
plants (licensed before 1 July 1987) and for new plants (licensed after 
July 1, 1987). For existing plants, member States can choose between 
complying with ELVs and implementing a national emission reduction 
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plan. All new plants must comply, although ELVs vary by the size of 
the plant and the fuel that is burned; in general, ELVs are more 
stringent for larger plants. Liquid fuels (such as oil) and solid fuels 
(such as coal) have more lenient ELVs than does natural gas. 
The Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and the UK all submitted national emission reduction plans 
(Ritchie et al., 2005). This means that these Member States must 
reduce aggregate emissions for the country to the same levels that 
would have been achieved by applying the ELVs to existing plants in 
2000. Relative to the situation where are all plants of a certain size 
and fuel type are given identical limits, this should give more flexibility 
to the Member States. The efficiency gains from this flexibility will 
theoretically depend upon the level of firm heterogeneity, with more 
heterogeneity leading to greater cost savings. 
One exception to the LCPD regulations is the so-called “limited 
life derogation clause”. As noted by (Ritchie et al., 2005), “an operator 
of an existing plant may be exempted from compliance with the ELVs 
(emission limit values) and from inclusion in a national emission 
reduction plan if a written undertaken was submitted to the competent 
authority by 30 June 2004, not to operate the plant for more than 
20,000 operational hours starting from 1 January 2008 and ending no 
later than 31 December 2015”. This limited life derogation clause 
would thus require permanent closure of the plant after 20,000 h of 
operation. To put this in perspective, a plant operating for a little less 
than seven hours a day would be completely shut-down by 2015. If 
run continuously for 24 h a day, firms opting for the limited life 
derogation would have shut down by March of 2010. 
The Industrial Emissions Directive (IED), approved by plenary 
vote in the European Parliament on July 7, 2010 (Nind & Cronin, n.d.), 
supplanted the LCPD. The IED tightened emission limits beyond what 
was required by the LCPD beginning in 2016. It is important to note 
that the IED has no bearing on the pre-existing requirements of the 
LCPD (Nind & Cronin, n.d.). That is, the LCPD is irrevocable and the 
plants that were opted-out of the LCPD must still have been closed by 
the end of 2015. 
4. Conceptual framework 
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According to the standard theory of the firm, a firm will exit a 
competitive industry in the long run if they are realizing an economic 
loss. For large combustion plants, profitability is based upon plant 
output level, plant costs, and the price of the output good. In addition 
to typical fixed and variable costs, the EU plants were faced with an 
additional abatement cost when the LCPD went into effect. While the 
regulations apply to all EU plants, the limits vary based upon the 
characteristics of the plant. Specifically, different limits apply to plants 
of different sizes and fuel types. The cost of complying with identical 
limits may also vary from plant to plant. 
In the long run, a plant is opted-out of the ELVs if projected 
economic profit under the ELVs < 0. We assume that the probability of 
opting out of the LCPD depends upon the characteristics of the plant 
and a random draw. Thus, the probability of opting out due to a 
projected negative economic profit is represented by: 
(1) 
We do not directly observe price, output, capital, labor, fuel 
cost, competition, or abatement costs. Capital is proxied by the MWth 
rating of the plant. We construct a rough Herfindahl Index using total 
energy input to proxy competition, which also provides information 
about output price relative to cost. Depending on the current physical 
state of the plant, abatement costs may or may not drastically 
increase with the passage of the LCPD. Plants without FGD, for 
example, would face very large increases in abatement costs to 
comply with the SO2 limits of the directive. These plants must then 
project their economic profit, factoring in the increased abatement 
costs of installing FGD. 
Some of the plants would have remained in the industry in the 
absence of the LCPD, but the additional LCPD abatement costs would 
cause them to incur an economic loss. Thus, the firm chooses to opt-
out of the ELVs and, hence, shut down after 20,000 h of operation. 
However, it is likely that some plants would project an economic loss 
irrespective of the LCPD. We would not want to misattribute their 
eventually exit to the LCPD. The timing of the opt-out decision helps to 
separate out these two possibilities. Recall that the opt-out decision 
had to be submitted by 30 June 2004 but the ELVs did not apply until 
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2008. That is, opting-out would not provide any benefit during the 
years of 2004–2007. It is unlikely that a plant would be opted-out of 
the ELVs if it was expected to exit the industry by the end of 2007. 
Furthermore, we observe fuel usage and industrial emissions through 
2009, so we can see if there are any plants that were opted-out of the 
legislation and shut-down prior to the ELVs taking effect in 2008. 
There is no significant difference in the percentages of opted-out 
plants that report 0 total energy input by 2007 (15.4%) versus the 
non-opted-out plants that report 0 total energy input by 2007 
(10.8%).6 However, from an ex-ante perspective in 2004, it also 
possible that plants with better long-range planning would plan to 
continue operating through 2007 but to exit in 2008 or later regardless 
of the LCPD. For these plants, being opted-out of ELVs in 2004 would 
have minimized compliance costs, but eventual exit was anticipated. 
Therefore, we take the position that we are analyzing the decision to 
opt-out plants from the ELVs and acknowledge that the opt-out choice 
may have been for reasons unrelated to the legislation. 
One primary aim is to empirically analyze which, if any, 
industries have been most impacted by the LCPD opt-out decision after 
controlling for the size of the plant and country characteristics. 
Furthermore, we form several testable hypotheses regarding the 
characteristics of plants. All else equal, we hypothesize the following. 
1. 
Plants using dirtier fuels, such as coal, would face larger 
abatement costs to comply with the LCPD, and hence would 
exhibit face a higher probability of opting-out of the ELVs. For 
example, approximately 95 percent of the sulphur in coal is 
emitted as SO2 during combustion and 80 to 90 percent of ash 
in coal leaves the boilers along with the flue gases as particulate 
matter (Loyd and Craigie, 2011). Controlling these emissions 
generally requires installing expensive capital upgrades. 
2. 
Countries with national emissions reduction plans have more 
flexibility in how they achieve their emissions reductions than 
countries that rely solely on the LCPD ELVs. Hence, plants in 
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these countries should exhibit a lower probability of opting-out 
of the ELVs. 
3. 
Plants in less competitive industries have more market power 
and should be more profitable. Therefore, these plants should 
exhibit a lower probability of opting-out of the ELVs. 
5. Data 
The data for our analysis come directly from the European 
Environmental Agency (EEA). Each EU member country is responsible 
for tracking and reporting data to the EEA on all plants that have 
megawatt thermal (MWth) greater than 50. The EEA has collected 
several waves of the LCPD data; the first wave spans years 2004–
2006 and the second wave includes years 2007–2009. As of January 
2017, EEA has released data through 2014.7 Through plant matching, 
we combine the first two waves to obtain one dataset that includes a 
total of 3401 plants for the years 2004 to 2009.8 The dataset contains 
information on various energy inputs, total energy used by plants, 
MWth, and plant emissions on an annual basis. 
Only plants from the following 17 countries were opted-out of 
the LCPD: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, 
Spain, Finland, France, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovak Republic, and United Kingdom. We therefore focus 
only on the 1585 plants in these countries.9 Out of these plants, 194 
plants were opted out of the LCPD. Table 1 shows the breakdown of 
plants by country and by opt-out decision. 
Table 1. Breakdown of plants by opt-out decision in each country. 
Country Not opted-out Opted-out Total 
Belgium 97 3 100 
Bulgaria 34 2 36 
Cyprus 2 1 3 
Denmark 30 2 32 
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Country Not opted-out Opted-out Total 
Estonia 15 2 17 
Finland 182 21 203 
France 264 24 288 
Greece 58 2 60 
Latvia 26 3 29 
Malta 6 4 10 
Poland 65 31 96 
Portugal 24 3 27 
Romania 143 41 184 
Slovakia 67 9 76 
Slovenia 16 2 18 
Spain 130 23 153 
UK 232 21 253 
Total 1391 194 1585 
We identify the industry for each plant in the dataset using the 
reported information supplemented by a manual search. A majority of 
plants identified the sector in which they were operating in the second 
wave of the LCPD. There were six classifications given: Electricity 
Supply Industry (ES), Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants, District 
Heating (DH), Iron and Steel, Refineries, and Other non-refineries. In 
total, 1336 plants were labeled with these classifications. For the 
missing plants and for the category of other non-refineries, we 
conducted a search using plant and firm websites and other sources to 
identify the sectors of the remaining plants. Table 2 shows the final 
classification of our plants by sector. The largest sectors are ES, CHP, 
DH, and refineries. We also see that the ES sector has the largest 
number of opt-outs. In the appendix, we provide the breakdown of 
firms in our dataset by country and sector. 
Table 2. Breakdown of plants by opt-out decision in each 
industry. 
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Industry Not opted-out Opted-out Total 
Sugar 48 3 51 
Paper 38 5 43 
Chemicals 70 0 70 
Refining 151 3 154 
Iron/Steel 31 1 32 
Electricity Supply (ES) 353 86 439 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 406 55 461 
District Heating (DH) 143 37 180 
Other 73 4 76 
Other Unknown 79 0 79 
Total 1391 194 1585 
For our dependent variable we use the information on each opt-
out decision to construct a dummy variable opt-out, which is a value of 
1 if a firm decided to opt-out a plant at the beginning of 2004 and 0 if 
not. Emissions and energy usage must still be reported for opted-out 
plants because they still have 20,000 h to operate before they must 
shut down. The dataset also contains information on each plants' 
megawatt thermal (MWth) combustion capacity, which we use as our 
measure of plant size.10 The dataset does not include information on 
plant output but does include various measures of energy inputs. The 
fuel used by plants includes biomass input, other solid fuels, liquid 
fuels, natural gas, and other gas. We also have total energy input for 
each plant (total energy input), which is obtained by summing all 
energy used. We note that “other solid fuels” contains coal and lignite. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for each of the variables. 
Table 3. Summary statistics for all variables. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
MWth 455.1 869.9614 35 12069 1519 
Biomass 127.2 519.178 0 6200.598 1244 
Other solid fuel 4186 15196.35 0 267553.5 1244 
Liquid fuel 490.1 1866.198 0 38396.18 1244 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Natural gas 1739 5026.634 0 83749.52 1244 
Other gas 357.7 1256.813 0 13965.76 1244 
Note: Energy input measures are in terajoules (TJ). 
We first examine whether plants that were opted-out differ in 
their observable characteristics from the plants that chose to remain 
under the ELVs of the LCPD for each industry. In Table 4, we compare 
these plants within each industry using the five main firm 
characteristics: MWth, Biomass, Other solid fuel, Liquid fuel, Natural 
gas, and Other gas.Table 4 shows that opted-out paper plants burn 
significantly more Other solid fuel than plants that would comply with 
the LCPD ELVs. For the refining industry, opted-out plants burn 
significantly less Natural gas. In the ES industry, opted-out plants burn 
more Liquid fuel and less Natural gas. Opted-out CHP plants tend to be 
larger, burn more Other solid fuel and less Biomass, Liquid fuel, and 
Natural gas. Finally, in the DH industry, opted-out plants are larger 
and burn more Other solid fuel, less Liquid fuel, and less Other gas. 
Table 4. Comparing means of variables plants based on opt-out 
decision. 
Sector Variable Not Opted-Out Opted-Out t-test 
Sugar 
 
MWth 116.22 107.39 0.76 
Biomass a a b 
Other solid fuel 129.33 245.00 b 
Liquid fuel 156.76 808.00 b 
Natural gas 209.94 0.00 b 
Other gas 1.97 0.00 b 
Paper 
 
MWth 107.71 242.90 −1.62 
Biomass 532.69 700.95 −0.23 
Other solid fuel 268.94 1964.09 −2.72** 
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Sector Variable Not Opted-Out Opted-Out t-test 
Liquid fuel 112.32 35.36 1.47 
Natural gas 384.36 158.24 1.37 
Other gas 1.07 4.05 −0.71 
Refining 
 
MWth 224.53 851.33 −1.06 
Biomass a a b 
Other solid fuel 127.42 0.00 1.00 
Liquid fuel 1287.77 19232.06 −0.94 
Natural gas 426.97 0.00 3.23*** 
Other gas 1760.10 1284.24 0.49 
Iron/Steel 
 
MWth 219.52 1199.00 b 
Biomass a a b 
Other solid fuel 624.75 6363.60 b 
Liquid fuel 244.79 244.79 b 
Natural gas 281.46 47.28 b 
Other gas 2826.59 5716.88 b 
Electricity Supply (ES) 
 
MWth 993.93 1180.92 −1.27 
Biomass 118.19 121.95 −0.07 
Other solid fuel 10990.43 7918.28 1.21 
Liquid fuel 640.48 1313.42 −2.09** 
Natural gas 4021.99 1101.47 4.97*** 
Other gas 193.03 379.46 −1.08 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 
 
MWth 294.45 430.69 −1.91* 
Biomass 273.46 10.21 6.40*** 
Other solid fuel 2407.99 4091.88 −1.78* 
Liquid fuel 127.72 49.61 2.30** 
Natural gas 1754.26 354.33 4.92*** 
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Sector Variable Not Opted-Out Opted-Out t-test 
Other gas 87.79 29.68 1.45 
District Heating (DH) 
 
MWth 139.27 183.87 −1.70* 
Biomass 4.28 0.98 1.58 
Other solid fuel 39.19 321.26 −1.85* 
Liquid fuel 66.00 20.38 2.99*** 
Natural gas 360.47 272.35 0.70 
Other gas 1.38 0.00 1.71* 
Note: Values represent means. Fuel is in terajoules (TJ). a: no 
observations for this industry. b: too few observations within industry 
to conduct t-tests. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, 
***Significant at 1%. 
We also measure firm concentration and competition for each 
industry and country using the Herfindahl Index. Because the dataset 
does not provide any output measures or sales, we use total energy 
input as a proxy measure to construct our Herfindahl Index. Energy 
input should be positively correlated with output but using energy 
input as proxy for output ignores differences in productivity across 
plants. Furthermore, we acknowledge that we only observe large 
plants in our analysis and the Herfindahl Index may not be appropriate 
for some sectors since we do not know how many firms operate in 
each sector. For some sectors, there may exist small firms (MWth < 
50) that have a good portion of market share in these industries. The 
Herfindahl Index ranges from 0 to 1, where industries with a value 
closer to 1 are generally less competitive and plants have greater 
market power. Table 5 summarizes the Herfindahl Index for each 
industry.11 
Table 5. Herfindahl Indices by industry. 
Sector Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
Sugar 0.15 0.18 51 
Paper 0.25 0.28 43 
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Sector Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
Chemicals 0.13 0.19 69 
Refining 0.12 0.17 154 
Iron/Steel 0.38 0.29 32 
Electricity Supply (ES) 0.06 0.06 439 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 0.06 0.13 461 
District Heating (DH) 0.07 0.08 180 
Other 0.12 0.18 77 
Other Unknown 0.28 0.36 79 
6. Results 
We begin by looking at the impact of the LCPD on industries as 
classified in Table 2. We first estimate the following probit model on a 
cross-section of plant level observations12: 
(2) 
where MWTH is the plant's size, Ii, are indicator variables for each 
industry, and cj are country controls. Our dependent variable is Opt-
outi, which is equal to 1 if a plant was opted-out of the LCPD and will 
shut down by 2015 and 0 if a plant complies with the LCPD ELVs. The 
results for this specification are in Table 6. Specification I of Table 6 
shows results without controlling for plant size or country differences. 
We drop the Refinery industry for collinearity and all coefficients 
presented are relative to this industry.13 We see that the coefficients 
on Paper, ES, CHP, and DH industries are positive and highly 
significant. Thus, an average plant in these four industries has a higher 
probability of opting-out of the LCPD relative to plants in the Refinery 
industry. For example, plants in the ES industry, on average, are 30.5 
percentage points more likely to be opted-out relative to Refineries. 
Table 6. Probit regression results for opt-out by industry. 
 Specification 
I 
Specification 
II 
Specification 
III 
Sugar 0.127 0.133 0.105 
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 Specification 
I 
Specification 
II 
Specification 
III 
(0.112) (0.113) (0.108) 
Paper 
0.254∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 
(0.126) (0.127) (0.127) 
Iron/Steel 
0.045 0.046 0.026 
(0.121) (0.122) (0.103) 
Electricity Supply 
(ES) 
0.305∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 
(0.069) (0.070) (0.069) 
Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP) 
0.209∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.063) 
District Heating 
(DH) 
0.371∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 
(0.091) (0.091) (0.097) 
Other 
0.107 0.115 0.108 
(0.097) (0.098) (0.096) 
MWth 
 0.000019∗∗ 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Country FE No No Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.057 0.107 
Observations 1437 1406 1406 
Note: Coefficients represent average marginal effects on the 
probability of being opted-out from the LCPD ELV's. Specifications I-III 
represent three specifications of the probit model given by equation 
(2) in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust. 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
Specification II adds plant size and the sign and significance of 
coefficients for plants in Paper, ES, CHP, and DH industries remain 
similar to those in specification I. The coefficient for MWth is positive 
and significant implying that larger plants have a higher probability of 
opting-out. In Specification III, we control for country differences 
using a set of indicator variables and see that our results still hold. 
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Next, we run our specifications to test the three hypotheses 
stated in the conceptual framework: 
(3) 
where X are observable firm characteristics including MWth and fuel 
usage, Hij is the Herfindahl Index as a measure of market 
concentration for each industry i and country j, and NPj is an indicator 
for plants in countries that selected to design their own national 
emissions reduction plans. Table 7 presents results for these three 
hypotheses. For our first hypothesis, we examine how fuel type 
impacts the opt-out decision. We see in specification I that plants 
burning higher levels of natural gas have a lower probability of opting-
out of the LCPD ELVs and plants burning higher amounts of liquid fuels 
have a higher probability of opting-out. Controlling for plant size, we 
see in specification II that the coefficients for Natural gas and Other 
solid fuels are also negative and significant. We see that the size of 
plants is also important as larger plants have a higher probability of 
opting-out. In specification III, we add country controls and see again 
that Natural gas and Other solid fuel remain negative and significant. 
Table 7. Probit regression results for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. 
 Specification 
I 
Specification 
II 
Specification 
III 
Biomass 
−0.028 −0.037 −0.047* 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.024) 
Other solid fuel 
0.0002 −0.008*** −0.007*** 
(0.0005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Liquid fuel 
0.010** −0.0001 0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Natural gas 
−0.012*** −0.021*** −0.020*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Other gas 
−0.015 −0.016* 0.003 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) 
Herfindahl 
Index 
−0.184** −0.158* −0.027 
(0.089) (0.083) (0.074) 
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 Specification 
I 
Specification 
II 
Specification 
III 
National Plan 
−0.071*** −0.068*** −0.055*** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
MWth 
 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Industry FE No No Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.0934 0.142 
Observations 1244 1236 1184 
Note: Coefficients represent average marginal effects on the 
probability of being opted-out from the LCPD ELV's. Specifications I-III 
represent three specifications of the probit model given by equation 
(3) in the text. Variables are scaled so that all fuel variables are in 
petajoules. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust. 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
For our second hypothesis, we test whether plants in countries 
that selected national reduction plans instead of the LCPD ELVs had a 
lower probability of exiting. We see that the dummy variable National 
Plan is negative and highly significant in all three specifications of 
Table 7. This means that plants located in countries with national 
emission reduction plans have a 5.5 to 7.1 percentage point decrease 
in the probability of opting-out as compared plants located in countries 
that simply adopted the LCPD ELVs. 
Finally, for our last hypothesis, we proposed that plants 
operating in less competitive industries will be less likely to have been 
opted-out. Plants in less competitive industries have generally more 
market power which leads to higher profit and better ability to comply 
with the LCPD regulation. In specification I of Table 7 the coefficient 
for the Herfindahl Index is negative and significant meaning that as 
competition decreases and firms have more market power, the 
probability of opting-out is reduced. This is also true in specification II 
where we control for plant size. 
7. Discussion 
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As expected, EU large combustion plants in different industries 
are responding differently to the LCPD. We find that Paper, ES, CHP, 
and DH plants have an increased probability of being opted-out of the 
LCPD relative to Refinery plants. The marginal effect for these 
industries ranges from 15.9 percentage points for CHP plants in 
specification III of Table 6 to 38.2 percentage points for DH plants in 
specification II of Table 6. Regardless of the reason for the decision to 
opt out, the future composition of these industries, especially energy 
utilities, will be changed because fewer plants will be in operation. 
We have also stated three testable hypotheses in our conceptual 
framework. Regarding the first hypothesis, we find that plants that 
burn more natural gas and more other solid fuels (coal or lignite) have 
lower probabilities of opting out of the LCPD and subsequently shutting 
down. The finding for natural gas is expected. First, natural gas plants 
tend to be newer and more likely than older plants to have better 
pollution abatement technologies. Second, natural gas is a much 
cleaner burning fuel than oil or coal so, even without significant 
investments in pollution abatement technologies, emissions will tend 
to be lower than other fuel types. There are several plausible 
explanations for the unexpected finding for solid fuels. The ELVs 
specified in the LCPD are much more lenient for solid fuels than for 
natural gas. Policy makers wrote the law this way in part because of 
the inherent differences in the emissions from different fuel types. It 
might also be speculated that various industries, such as the coal 
industry, were at least marginally successful in influencing the ELVs for 
their fuel type. A second possible explanation is that a large portion of 
coal plants had already installed FGD prior to the LCPD. It is generally 
accepted that FGD controls between 90 and 99 percent of sulfur 
dioxide emissions. The SO2 ELVs, therefore, may only be binding for 
plants without FGD already installed. To the extent that the installation 
of abatement technologies has not been cost prohibitive for coal 
plants, the SO2 ELVs may not be stringent enough to force these 
plants to shut down. Similar arguments can be made for the ELVs with 
regard to NOx and particular matter. A third possible explanation is 
that many countries still have large and reliable domestic coal mines. 
Governments of these countries may be trying to find ways to help 
coal plants remain in operation. This may be especially true in 
countries that have state-owned coal fired plants and coal mines. 
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We find support for our second hypothesis regarding a national 
emission plan for certain countries. In Table 7, National Plan, 
representing plants located in Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, 
Portugal, and UK, is associated with a five to seven percentage point 
decrease in the probability of opting-out of the LCPD. This evidence 
suggests that plants in countries that took advantage of structuring 
their national emission policy may be more likely to survive. Finally, as 
reported in in Table 7, we find evidence in support of our third 
hypothesis concerning market power where we show that plants in 
industries with more market power have a lower probability of opting-
out. This is not surprising since more profitable firms should have 
greater ability to make the capital investments necessary to reduce 
emission levels as required by the LCPD ELVs. 
8. Conclusions and policy Implications 
With the enactment of the LCPD, the European Union made a 
significant legislative commitment to limiting pollution by large 
combustion plants. On the whole, this policy is expected to improve air 
quality for EU citizens and have a positive effect on the environment. 
To date, there has been little systematic analysis to determine how 
plants with different characteristics and in different industries are 
responding to the LCPD. We take the first step to better understand 
which plants are being “opted-out” of the LCPD ELVs under the 
“limited life derogation clause.” These plants are required to shut down 
operations after 20,000 h starting in 2008. 
We obtain data from the EEA for all 17 EU countries where firms 
opted for the “limited life derogation clause” and merge this with 
information about plant location, size, industry, and energy inputs. We 
find that plants in the Paper, ES, CHP, and DH industries have a 
significantly increased probability of opting-out of the LCPD ELVs and 
eventually shutting down. The ES, CHP, and DH industries constitute a 
substantial portion of combustion plants across Europe. Some 
countries may soon see the shutdown of many of their power 
generating plants (ES and CHP). For example, looking at Table 1 we 
see that Poland and Romania have a relatively large number of plants 
that have been opted-out of the ELVs and will shut down. We also see 
in Table A1 (appendix) that ES and CHP account for 82 out of 96 
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combustion plants in Poland and 71 of 184 plants in Romania. This 
implies that these countries may experience a reduction in 
conventional capacity to generate power in the coming years; they will 
need to take the necessary steps to make up for the loss through new 
domestic energy sources or imports from neighboring countries. 
We find an unexpected result that the probability of a plant 
being opted-out and eventually closed decreases as the amount of coal 
or lignite burned increases. It is possible that the solid fuel ELVs are 
“too” lenient in the sense that it may be easier for coal plants to meet 
the ELVs than policy makers anticipated when writing the legislation. 
One piece of supporting evidence for this theory is that the new 
Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) significantly tightens ELVs for SO2 
and particulate matter for coal plants, while leaving the ELVs 
unchanged for gas burning plants for these same pollutants. 
Consistent with economic theory, we find that plants in more 
concentrated industries are less likely to be opted out. Regulators 
considering issues of market power may want to consider this interplay 
between environmental regulations and firm concentration as they 
design and implement policy. Finally, we analyze countries that 
selected to use national reduction plans to achieve the goals set by the 
LCPD and find support that these national reduction plans may be 
preferred to the command-and-control approach of ELVs. This 
suggests that leaders of EU countries may be wise to develop national 
plans to comply with EU environmental regulations as these plans can 
give them more flexibility to meet overall targets. 
We believe that more work is necessary to investigate the 
consequences of the LCPD policy across the EU. We have provided a 
first look at which plants are opted-out of the LCPD ELVs, but there 
remain many unanswered questions regarding the LCPD and the IED. 
As mentioned in the conceptual framework, one limitation of our study 
is that we do not know whether some of the plants that were opted-
out would have eventually shut down even if there were no LCPD. It is 
possible that some of these plants that were opted-out of the LCPD 
would have needed investment in order to continue operating even 
without LCPD emission limits. For some plants, the LCPD may have 
been the determining factor in the decision to shut down. At the least, 
our results suggest that the LCPD could be contributing to plant exit in 
certain industries and for certain plants. EU regulators looking for 
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further evidence would be wise to survey large combustion plants to 
learn more about the opt-out decision, including the firm's motivation 
for opting out of the ELVs and what would have happened to the plant 
in absence of the LCPD regulation.14 
We also believe that more research is warranted in determining 
the monetary cost of achieving the LCPD ELVs for certain countries. 
That is, when a firm chooses to keep a plant operating, how much 
does it cost to achieve the required reductions in sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter? This question has largely been 
answered for many countries, both on an ex-ante and ex-post basis.15 
However, other countries (such as Bosnia and Herzegovina) are still 
considering joining the EU. As a South East Europe (SEE) Programme 
Area country, Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a treaty to adopt and 
enforce the LCPD by 2017 (Dimitrijević et al., 2011; Dimitrijević and 
Tatić, 2012). Answering this cost question for SEE countries requires 
detailed information about the production processes at specific plants 
because the marginal costs of reducing emissions can vary widely 
depending on plant characteristics.16 Additional research can provide 
cost estimates to compare with the benefits of required missions 
reduction—namely lower external costs—to find the net benefits of the 
legislation for specific regions or countries. We hope that our work 
spurs more effort to develop a more complete representation of the 
economic consequences of this environmental policy. 
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Appendix.  
Table A1. Breakdown of plants by Industry and Country 
Coun
try 
Sug
ar 
Pap
er 
Chemi
cals 
Refini
ng 
Iron/S
teel 
E
S 
CH
P 
D
H 
Oth
er 
Other 
Unkno
wn 
Tot
al 
Belgiu
m 
2 1 14 18 5 27 22 0 9 2 100 
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Coun
try 
Sug
ar 
Pap
er 
Chemi
cals 
Refini
ng 
Iron/S
teel 
E
S 
CH
P 
D
H 
Oth
er 
Other 
Unkno
wn 
Tot
al 
Bulga
ria 
0 0 0 2 1 4 17 7 0 5 36 
Cypru
s 
0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Denm
ark 
2 0 0 3 0 0 26 0 1 0 32 
Estoni
a 
0 0 0 0 0 0 10 7 0 0 17 
Finlan
d 
0 2 0 5 0 26 
15
1 
15 0 4 203 
Franc
e 
33 17 33 17 7 35 71 10 30 35 288 
Greec
e 
0 0 0 9 2 47 1 1 0 0 60 
Latvia 2 0 0 1 0 2 2 19 2 1 29 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 
Polan
d 
2 2 5 2 2 27 55 0 1 0 96 
Portu
gal 
0 7 0 4 0 10 6 0 0 0 27 
Roma
nia 
0 1 1 9 2 18 53 94 4 2 184 
Slova
kia 
5 3 2 1 3 23 6 24 9 0 76 
Slove
nia 
0 0 0 0 0 4 2 3 0 9 18 
Spain 0 2 1 33 0 
10
9 
0 0 0 8 153 
UK 5 8 14 50 10 94 39 0 20 13 253 
Total 51 43 70 154 32 
43
9 
46
1 
18
0 
76 79 
158
5 
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Note: ES = Electricity Supply, CHP=Combined Heat and Power, 
DH = District Heating. 
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